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RONDEAU v. MOSINEE PAPER CORPORATION
AND IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Incumbent management, feeling relatively secure in its control of
corporate proxy machinery, was jolted into a state of alarm during the
1960's by the phenomenal growth of the cash tender offer as a means of
acquiring corporate control.1 A cash tender offer is a publicly made
invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their
shares for sale at a specified price usually representing a premium over
the current market price.2 In addition to cash tender offers, rapid and
substantial open market or privately negotiated purchases were being
used either to acquire control or as a prelude to subsequent cash tender
offers.3 Incumbent management was alarmed not only by the speed
with which the purchasers could act, but also by the fact that "persons
seeking control in these ways were able to operate in almost complete
secrecy concerning their intentions, their commitments, and even their
identities."'4  And when management began to respond vigorously to
takeover attempts, the investors, caught in the crossfire of corporate
battle, were forced to make hasty, uninformed investment decisions.5
A primary goal of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 is the full
disclosure of information needed by investors who participate in the
securities markets. Full disclosure theoretically serves a twofold pur-
pose. First, it insures intelligent investment decisionmaking, which
results in the efficient allocation of investment capital. Second, it
enhances public confidence in the securities markets, resulting in their
1. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967
Senate Report]; Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1967) (testimony by
Manuel Cohen, SEC chairman) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings]; 116 CONG.
REc. 29251 (1970) (remarks of Senator Williams); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash
Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv. 135 (1967).
2. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HAlv. L. REv. 1250 (1973). The commentator notes that
recent cases have expanded the meaning of tender offer to include offers to purchase
securities that are likely to pressure shareholders into making uninformed, ill-considered
decisions to sell.
3. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 24 (testimony by Manuel Cohen).
4. 113 CONG. Rac. 855 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
5. See 1967 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2; 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note
1, at 178 (testimony by Manuel Cohen); id. at 57 (testimony by Professor Hayes); 114
CONG. REc. 21954 (1968) (remarks of Senator Bennett).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
healthy growth and development.7  The dramatic increase in corporate
takeover attempts revealed a significant gap in investor protection in
that full disclosure was not required in connection with cash tender
offers or any other substantial open market or privately negotiated
purchases.' It was also apparent that incumbent management was
disadvantaged in corporate power struggles, as insurgents could act
covertly in seeking to buy controlling blocks of shares.9
In order to force broad disclosure by tender offerors and others
seeking corporate control, Congress in 1968 passed the Williams Act
which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding sections
13(d), 13(e), 14(d), and 14(e).' 0 Subsequently, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, under its rulemaking power, further defined
these provisions." Section 13(d) requires any person who acquires 5
percent 12 or more of a class of securities of a corporation 3 to file within
ten days after the acquisition a Schedule 13D' 4 with the issuing corpo-
ration, the SEC, and each exchange where the security is traded. This
filing discloses the background and identity of the purchaser, the
amount and purpose of the purchases, and the source of the funds used
for the purchases. Also, if the purchaser intends to acquire control, he
must describe any plans he may have to make major changes in the
business or corporate structure of the issuer. Section 13(e) requires
disclosure when a corporation repurchases its own securities. Section
7. 1967 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 1.
8. See id.; 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 18 (testimony by Manuel Co-
hen); id. at 71 (testimony by Donald Calvin, vice president, New York Stock Ex-
change); 113 CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams); 113 CONG. REC.
24665 (1967) (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
9. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 2-3 (opening remarks by Senator
Williams); id. at 43 (remarks by Senator Kuchel); 116 CoNG. REc. 29252-53 (1970)
(letter to Senator Williams from James Walker, Jr., executive vice president, American
Stock Exchange); 111 CONG. REC. 28258 (1965) (remarks by Senator Williams).
10. Act of July 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2-3, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (e) (1970)).
11. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1-4, 240.13d-101, 240.13e-1, 240.14d-1-4, 240.14d-
101 (1975).
12. Originally the reporting point was 10% but this was lowered to 5% by the
1970 amendments to the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (1970).
13. Sections 13(d) and 14(d) apply to the securities of corporations required to
be registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the securi-
ties of insurance companies which would have been required to register under section
12 except for the exemption contained in section 12(g) (2) (G), and the securities of
closed-end investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80 (1970). Section 13 (e) has similar jurisdictional requirements but it does
not apply to insurance companies. Section 14(e) applies to tender offers made to the
shareholders of any corporation.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 provides detailed instructions for making a proper fil-
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14(d) requires a Schedule 13D filing when a tender offer is made that if
consummated will result in the purchaser acquiring 5 percent or more of
a class of securities of a corporation. The disclosure is made simulta-
neously with' the tender offer so that shareholders can decide, in an
informed manner, whether to tender their shares. 15 Section 14(e) is an
anti-fraud provision that makes unlawful any material misstatements or
omissions made in connection with a tender offer.
Despite the great amount of litigation under the Williams Act, it
was not until 1975 that the standards for granting injunctive relief to
private litigants were settled. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,'6
the United States Supreme Court held that a showing of irreparable
harm is necessary before a private litigant can obtain injunctive relief
based on section 13(d). Although Rondeau has broad ramifications,
this note will concentrate on its impact on private litigants suing for
injunctive relief under section 13(d). First, the section 13(d) cases
prior to Rondeau will be discussed briefly. Then the discussion will
focus on Rondeau and will show that its definition of irreparable harm,
based on an overly narrow interpretation of the purposes of the Williams
Act, hinders that act's enforcement. Finally, it will be argued that since
the public interest is furthered by the private enforcement of the securi-
ties laws, a showing of irreparable harm should not be required of
private litigants seeking injunctive relief under section 13(d).
Pre-Rondeau Section 13(d) Cases
After the passage of the Williams Act a number of suits were
brought by private parties17 seeking remedies for violations of section
13(d).' While the obvious purpose of these suits was to delay or
defeat a possible takeover attempt, the private parties were also serving
15. Prior to the passage of the Williams Act, the typical tender offer had several
characteristics that pressured shareholders into making hasty decisions, such as the prac-
tice that tenders be accepted in the order of receipt, the requirement that tenders be
made irrevocably, and the possibility that the purchase price may be changed during the
offer. Section 14(d) also contains provisions that minimize these pressure characteris-
tics.
16. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
17. The private parties were primarily corporations, but shareholders brought suit
also. See, e.g., Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.NJ. 1974).
18. Typically, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, although damages are avail-
able when a section 13(d) violation is causally connected to a business loss. In a case
involving a wholly owned subsidiary of the plaintiff that was competing for a lucrative
navy shipbuilding contract, the court found that the defendant's failure to file a timely
Schedule 13D adversely affected the subsidiary's chances of acquiring the contract. Bath
Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). If the subsidiary had failed to obtain the
contract because of the defendants' undisclosed activities, a possible cause of action for
damages would have arisen.
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the public interest by securing enforcement of the statute. The Wil-
liams Act did not expressly provide any remedies, but the Supreme
Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak'9 earlier held that private parties had
standing under the Securities Exchange Act of 193420 to sue for injunc-
tive relief or damages.
In resolving section 13(d) cases, the courts follow a two step
process." The first step is to determine if a violation has occurred.
Violations include late or inadequate Schedule 13D filings and failures
to make amendments to previous filings. 22  Once a violation is found,
the court proceeds to the second step, which is to determine what relief,
if any, should be granted. A violation does not necessarily result in the
granting of relief, -1 3 as generally relief will be granted only when it will
further the legislative purpose of the Williams Act.24
It is not surprising that the pre-Rondeau cases involved motions for
preliminary injunctions, as Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp.,25 the first appellate court decision interpreting the
Williams Act, encouraged such relief. The court emphasized that
"relief can best be given" when a motion for a preliminary injunction is
made because it is at this stage of the trial that the court has a variety of
tools available to do equity.2 6 Electronic Specialty involved alleged
violations of sections 14(d) and 14(e), and with tender offers the
advantages of giving relief as soon as possible are clear. If inadequate
filings make a tender offer misleading, the courts at the preliminary
injunction stage can immediately require correction, thus avoiding the
19. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
20. Standing for private litigants is based on section 27 of the 1934 act. See notes
125-31 and accompanying text infra.
21. Some of the early Williams Act cases failed to realize the need to separate
"'the question of whether a violation of the Act has occurred from the question of what
relief should be granted if a violation is found." Young, Judicial Enforcement of the
Williams Amendments: The Need to Separate the Questions of Violation and Relief,
27 Bus. LAw. 391, 413 (1972). The Supreme Court has directed the federal courts to
take the two-step approach in resolving securities law cases. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970).
22. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), (d)(2) (1970). The courts have reached dif-
ferent results as to the elements of a violation. Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot held that
shareholders were a group under section 13 (d) (3), and were therefore subject to the fil-
ing requirements of section 13(d) (1), when they agreed to act in concert to acquire ad-
ditional shares. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). GAF Corp. v. Milstein, on the other
hand, interpreted section 13(d)(3) more broadly and held that shareholders were a
group when they agreed to act in concert to influence or change the control of the is-
suer regardless of whether they agreed to acquire shares. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971).
23. See Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ozark
Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
24. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 57-58 (D.N.J. 1974).
25. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
26. Id. at 947.
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difficulties of trying to undo a consummated tender offer. The same
reasoning applies to section 13(d) cases in which the violator is making
open market or privately negotiated purchases as a prelude to an immi-
nent proxy contest or tender offer. Furthermore, if the plaintiff seems
likely to be able to prove a section 13(d) violation, it is in the interest of
the entire marketplace to require immediate and full disclosure.
Application of the Traditional Standard
The traditional standard that courts use to decide whether to grant
a preliminary injunction is (1) a showing by the plaintiff of the proba-
bility of success on the merits and (2) a showing that irreparable harm
will result if relief is denied.17  The pre-Rondeau cases using this
standard reached different results on similar facts because the courts
disagreed over what constitutes irreparable harm. In one group of
cases, the courts concluded that irreparable harm consists of more than a
mere violation of section 13(d). The irreparable harm found sufficient
for injunctive relief included a large potential business loss28 and a costly
proxy contest29 that were causally connected to section 13(d) violations.
In contrast, several cases denied motions for preliminary injunctions
because the plaintiffs failed to show any harm caused by the alleged
section 13(d) violations.30 Since the plaintiffs failed to show that any
investors were actually misled or deceived by the failure to file a timely
and adequate Schedule 13D, the courts felt that granting injunctive
relief would not promote the purposes of the Williams Act."'
In the second group of cases, a mere violation of section 13(d)
constituted sufficient irreparable harm to justify granting preliminary
27. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687,
692 (2d Cir. 1973).
28' See Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). The Seventh Cir-
cuit's requirement of irreparable harm was subsequently discarded in Mosinee Paper
Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974). In Bath, however, the Seventh Cir-
cuit suggested in dicta that a mere showing of a tardy filing might be a sufficient basis
for granting injunctive relief. Rejecting the defendant's argument that the scope of the
relief granted was too broad, the court stated that a late filing may well be insufficient
to cure the failure to file earlier because the purpose of filing-to provide investors and
stockholders the opportunity to examine the insurgents' plans prior to selling or buying
stock in the corporation and to hear from incumbent management on the merits of the
insurgents' plans-would be defeated. Therefore, the late filing would fail to prevent
the evils that the Williams Act is designed to eliminate. Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427
F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970).
29. See Committee for New Management of Butler Aviation v. Widmark, 335 F.
Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974); Ozark Air
Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
31. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 57-58 (D.N.J. 1974).
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injunctive relief.3 2 None of the plaintiffs in these cases showed that any
investors were actually misled or deceived by the section 13(d) viola-
tion, and in one case the filing was only one or two weeks late. 3 Since
shareholders and general investors may have been uninformed or misin-
formed about a potential change in control and since the target corpora-
tion was unable immediately to inform its shareholders of the insurgents'
plans, there was sufficient irreparable harm to justify granting injunctive
relief. In short, since the courts believed that the very evils the Williams
Act was designed to prevent arose from any section 13 (d) violations,
injunctive relief was granted upon a mere showing of a violation.
Only one pre-Rondeau case did not require irreparable harm at all
as a prerequisite to a preliminary injunction. The defendant in Sisak v.
Wings & Wheels Express, Inc.34 filed a tardy Schedule 13D that omitted
material information that was known to the plaintiffs for a long time.
The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs "[did] not show any severe
(or, certainly, any irreparable) injury," but it felt compelled to grant a
preliminary injunction in order to enforce full compliance with a statute
designed to protect the public interest.3 5 Sisak took a more straightfor-
ward apprach than the second group of pre-Rondeau cases which, by
finding irreparable harm in a bare violation, seemed merely to be paying
lip service to the traditional irreparable harm requirement.
Application of the Second Circuit Standard
A new standard for preliminary injunctions in Williams Act cases
was laid down by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Gulf &
Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.36 Accord-
ing to this standard, the party seeking relief must either ( 1 ) show a prob-
ability of success on the merits plus possible irreparable injury (the tra-
ditional standard) or (2) raise questions serious enough to provide fair
grounds for litigation on the merits and show that the equities decidedly
favor him.3" The alternative to the traditional standard seems to replace
32. See Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Twin Fair,
Inc. v. Reger, 394 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. Int'l Mogul
Mines Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974); Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American
Consumer Indus., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 93,943, at 93,752
(D.N.J. 1973).
33. See Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., [1973 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,943, at 93,755 (D.N.J. 1973).
34. [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 92,991, at 90,665
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
35. Id. at 90,670.
36. 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 692-93; Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d
247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973).
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the irreparable harm requirement with a balance of the equities test,
making it easier for the petitioner to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
Two recent district court cases, however, suggested that the pre-
Rondeau Second Circuit still would have required irreparable harm
before granting preliminary injunctions to remedy section 13(d) viola-
tions.88 In Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman,3 9 a pre-tender offer battle erupt-
ed between two corporations with the incumbent management of Lafay-
ette, the target corporation, attempting to resist a potential takeover bid
by Jewelcor. Both sides requested broad preliminary injunctions but
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, applying the
Second Circuit standard, merely ordered the Lafayette directors to stop
purchasing Lafayette stock until they filed a Schedule 13D. This relief
was granted because the court was concerned that Jewelcor would be
irreparably harmed if the Lafayette directors continued to purchase the
stock without full disclosure.40 Denying the more sweeping relief re-
quested by both parties, the court, while balancing the equities, empha-
sized the absence of irreparable harm to either. 41 Also, in Twin Fair,
Inc. v. Reger42 the District Court for the Western District of New York
used the traditional standard, ignoring the Second Circuit alternative
standard established two years earlier. Broad preliminary injunctive
relief was granted because the defendant's 13(d) violation caused the
plaintiff possible irreparable injury.4 3
On the other hand, in Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.44 and Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v.
Wellington Associates,45 both involving alleged section 14(d) and
14(e) violations, the Second Circuit simply balanced the equities and
granted preliminary injunctions against the consummation of the tender
offers without requiring a showing of irreparable harm. The greater
willingness to grant preliminary injunctive relief in 14(d) and 14(e)
cases than in 13(d) cases seemed to rest on the assumption that to allow
an illegal tender offer to be consummated would have made it impossi-
ble to unravel the situation after a final determination of illegality on the
merits-a problem that the Second Circuit did not believe would arise
from section 13(d) violations. This assumption failed to recognize that
38. See Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Twin Fair,
Inc. v. Reger, 394 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
39. 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
40. Id. at 253.
41. Id. at 242, 252.
42. 394 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
43. Id. at 161.
44. 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
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most rapid, substantial open market or privately negotiated purchases
are a prelude to imminent proxy contests or tender offers.4"
Thus, the pre-Rondeau section 13(d) cases failed to develop a
uniform test for irreparable harm, and one case held47 while a number
of cases suggested that a showing of irreparable harm was not a prereq-
uisite to preliminary injunctions.48 At the same time, it was not clear
what standards would be applied in granting permanent injunctions
whose more severe and long-lasting impact might require different
considerations. These uncertainties were soon resolved by Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp.49
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.
Background
Francis Rondeau began making large purchases of Mosinee Paper
Corporation 50 stock in the over-the-counter market during April 1971,
allegedly with no intent to seek corporate control. He continued to
make purchases for the next several months, but failed to file a Schedule
13D until August 25, 1971, almost three months after his obligation to
file arose. At that time, he disclosed what he alleged was his newly
formed intent to seek control of Mosinee Paper. A week later, Mosinee
Paper brought suit under section 13(d) against Rondeau and several
co-defendants 5' requesting broad injunctive relief, including the divest-
ment of Mosinee Paper stock acquired by the defendants in violation of
section 13(d).52  The defendants moved for summary judgment,53
contending that relief should be denied because the defendants did not
46. See 111 CONG. Rac. 28259 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams). See also
Committee for New Management of Butler Aviation v. Widmark, 335 F. Supp. 146
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. See Sisak v. Wings & Wheels, Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,991, at 90,665 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
48. See, e.g., Twin Fair, Inc. v. Reger, 394 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975);
Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. Int'l Mogul Mines Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974); Wa-
ter & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. V 93,943, at 93,752 (D.N.J. 1973).
49. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
50. Mosinee Paper Corporation was engaged in the manufacture and sale of paper
products and plastics. It had increasing sales and profits until 1970. Earnings declined
in 1970 and the first quarter of 1971, which led the directors to reduce its dividend in
the spring of 1971. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686, 688 (W.D.
Wis. 1973). Thus, Mosinee Paper was a prime target for a takeover attempt.
51. The codefendants were various companies, a foundation controlled by Francis
Rondeau which had participated in the stock purchases, and two banks which had fi-
nanced some of the purchases.
52. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686, 688 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
53. Id.
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engage in a deliberate and covert noncompliance with section 13(d)
and because the plaintiff failed to show that it suffered irreparable
harm.54 Mosinee Paper countered that it did suffer irreparable harm
and that, in any event, irreparable harm was not a required element of its
claim for equitable relief.55 Acknowledging Rondeau's 13(d) viola-
tion, the district court nevertheless granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment since the plaintiff failed to show irreparable harm.
The only harm that the court thought Mosinee Paper suffered was the
anxiety of some of its employees and shareholders over a possible future
change in control of the corporation" (an anxiety that the court conced-
ed may have been worsened by Rondeau's failure to state the purpose of
his purchases in a timely Schedule 13D).57 Buttressing its decision, the
court further concluded that even if irreparable harm was not a prereq-
uisite to relief, the instant case did not offer an appropriate opportunity
to fashion equitable relief for the plaintiff.5 8  The anxiety suffered by
Mosinee Paper's employees and shareholders was a predictable conse-
quence of shareholder democracy and was not an evil that the Williams
Act was designed to prevent. Moreover, Rondeau did not engage in a
secret conspiracy to accumulate stock from unsuspecting shareholders
before disclosing his intentions.59 Rather he filed as soon as he learned
of the requirements and immediately after his plans to gain control of
Mosinee Paper crystallized.60
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court, declaring that "Rondeau's failure to timely file was more than a
mere technical violation of the Williams Act."'" By transgressing the
Williams Act, Rondeau harmed Mosinee Paper for "it did not timely
receive the relevant information surrounding Rondeau's potential to
effect control and was delayed in its efforts to make any necessary
response to that potential." 62  Most significantly, however, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that irreparable harm was not a prerequisite to per-
manent injunctive relief
[i]n view of the fact that as issuer of the securities [Mosinee Paper]
is in the best position to assure that the filing requirements of the
54. Id. at 693.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 690.
58. Id. at 694.
59. The district court found that Rondeau did not know that he was required to
file a Schedule 13D when he acquired 5% of a company's stock until he con-
suited his attorney on July 30, 1971. Rondeau had been advised that he did not have
to file with the SEC until his holdings in a company exceeded 10%. This was the law
until December 1970, when section 13(d)(1) was amended. Id. at 689-90.
60. Id. at 695-96.
61. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1016 (7th Cir. 1974). •
62. Id. at 1017.
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Williams Act are being timely and fully complied with and to ob-
tain speedy and forceful remedial action when necessary. 6a3
Not only was Mosinee Paper vindicating "its statutory right to full and
timely disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the potential to effect
a change of control in its ownership and operations," but it was also
safeguarding the interests of the investing public by ensuring full com-
pliance with a statute designed to protect the public interest.64 The
court of appeals rejected the district court's contention that since Ron-
deau purchased the stock for investment purposes and unintentionally
failed to timely file a Schedule 1 3D, equitable relief was inappropriate.
According to the court of appeals, the language and legislative history
of the Williams Act made it clear that
the reporting requirements of section 13(d) apply regardless of the
purchaser's purpose in acquiring the shares. The sweep of section
13(d) goes beyond the circumstances where the purchaser has
formulated an intent to control, but also reaches that point when
because of the size of the purchaser's holdings (having attained five
percent beneficial ownership of a class of stock) and the fact that
he acquired such holdings in a short amount of time, the purchaser
portends the potential to effectuate a change in control. 65
The district court was directed to enter a decree enjoining Rondeau
and his associates from further violating section 13 (d) and from voting
the 3 percent of Mosinee Paper's stock acquired in violation of section
13 (d) in any takeover attempt, proxy contest, or director's election for
five years. Such relief was deemed necessary to neutralize Rondeau's
violation of the act and to deny him the benefit of his wrongdoing.66
The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that a
showing of irreparable harm is necessary before a private litigant can
obtain injunctive relief based upon section 13(d). Quoting from Bea-
con Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,67 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, stated that injunctive relief is "a remedy whose basis 'in the
federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1016.
66. Id. at 1017. Judge Pell dissented from the majority opinion. He wrote that
there was no basis in the record "for a determination of irreparable injury to the plain-
tiff" and "without irreparable harm being shown injunctive relief is not warranted."
Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1020 (Pell, J., dissenting). At the
same time, Judge Pell was skeptical of the majority's acceptance of the district court's
findings of fact, as he was concerned that there were genuine issues of fact which
should not have been disposed of by summary judgment. Id. at 1018, 1021.
67. 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959).
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remedies.' ",38 The Court concluded that Hecht Co. v. Bowles"9 fore-
closed the Seventh Circuit's position that the bare fact that Rondeau
violated the Williams Act justified injunctive relief.70 In Hecht, the
administrator of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, seeking to
restrain further violations of the statute, brought suit against a depart-
ment store. Although past violations were admitted, the defendant had
immediately corrected the violations when it became aware of them, and
had taken vigorous steps to prevent future violations.71 The Supreme
Court held that the district court, exercising its equitable discretion,
could refuse to grant any relief even though the Emergency Price
Control Act provided that injunctive relief should be granted upon a
showing of violation. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, rejected
the government's contention that an injunction was mandatory when the
statute was violated. "[f]f Congress had intended to make such a
drastic departure from the traditions of equity practice" by denying the
Court's discretion to grant or withhold relief, wrote Douglas, "an une-
quivocal statement of its purpose would have been made.17 2
Chief Justice Burger believed that Hecht's reasoning suggested that
the district court "was entirely correct in insisting that [Mosinee Paper]
satisfy the traditional prerequisites of extraordinary equitable relief by
establishing irreparable harm. ' 3
Also, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's
conclusion that Mosinee Paper was entitled to an injunction because it
was in the best position to insure compliance with the act, and it accused
the lower court of confusing the questions of liability and relief, which
are separate in private actions under the securities laws. 74 While causes
of action may be simplified under the securities laws because they are
recognized as serving the public interest, the Court concluded that relief
for private litigants is still determined according to traditional principles
which include a showing of irreparable harm.75
The Supreme Court decided that the harm allegedly suffered by
Mosinee Paper was clearly insufficient to constitute irreparable harm, 76
and it turned to the legislative history of the Williams Act to determine
what would constitute irreparable harm in a section 13(d) case:
The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public sharehold-
ers who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will
68. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975).
69. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
70. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60 (1975).
71. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1944).
72. Id. at 329.
73. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975).
74. Id. at 64.
75. Id. at 64-65.
76. Id. at 58-59.
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not be required to respond without adequate information regarding
the qualifications and intentions of the offering party. By requir-
ing disclosure of information to the target corporation as well as
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress intended to do
no more than give incumbent management an opportunity to ex-
press and explain its position. The Congress expressly disclaimed
an intention to provide a weapon for management to discourage
takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock which would
create the potential for such attempts. Indeed, the Act's draftsmen
commented upon the "extreme care" which was taken "to avoid tip-
ping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or
in favor of the person making the takeover bid."17 7
Therefore, irreparable harm occurs when a section 13(d) violation
puts the target corporation's shareholders at a disadvantage during a
tender offer, or makes the target corporation's management unable to
adequately place its case before the shareholders during a contest for
control."s Rondeau had not attempted to gain control of Mosinee
Paper either by a cash tender offer or by any other device. He had filed
a proper Schedule 13D after learning of his obligation to do so, and
there was no evidence suggesting that he would fail to comply with the
Williams Act requirements in the future. Mosinee Paper's shareholders
would not be disadvantaged if Rondeau were to make a tender offer,
and Mosinee Paper would be able to adequately place its case before the
shareholders if a contest for control were to develop. Therefore,
according to the Court, none of the evils at which the Williams Act was
directed had occurred or had threatened to occur.79
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Douglas joined, dissented."0
He did not believe that irreparable harm was a prerequisite to injunctive
relief for Williams Act violations. Reading the legislative history in a
different light from the majority and quoting liberally from the Seventh
Circuit's opinion, Justice Brennan argued that injunctive relief should be
granted upon the showing of a violation since
the Williams Act is a prophylactic measure conceived by Congress
as necessary to effect the congressional objective "that investors
77. Id.
78. Id. at 59.
79. Id. Mosinee Paper also argued that an injunction was necessary to protect
those shareholders who either sold their stock to Rondeau at predisclosure prices or
would not have invested had they known that a takeover bid was imminent. The Court
dismissed this argument, saying that it is not clear that this alleged harm is redressable
under the Williams Act, which is aimed at the dilemma of shareholders wanting to re-
spond to a cash tender offer. In any event, the Court believed that those persons who
allegedly sold their stock at an unfairly depressed price had an adequate remedy at law
in damages, and that the possibility of damage to those persons who bought stock
seemed remote, as there was a lack of an imminent contest for control. Id. at 59-60.
See note 88 infra.
80. Id. at 65. Justice Marshall dissented separately without opinion.
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and management be notified at the earliest possible moment of the
potential for a shift in corporate control."8'
Analysis of Rondeau
Broad Purpose of Williams Act
Assuming that irreparable harm is indeed a prerequisite for injunc-
tive relief, the Supreme Court's standard for irreparable harm is based on
an overly narrow interpretation of the Williams Act. The Williams Act
is intended to alert the entire marketplace to any potential change in
corporate control.8 2 That the marketplace is to be alerted at the earliest
moment after the potential for change in corporate control arises is
made clear by the 1970 amendment that lowered the reporting point
from 10 to 5 percent.83 Full disclosure of a potential change in control
serves a twofold purpose. First, investors84 can better evaluate the
corporation's worth in deciding whether to invest or divest, as a change
in management can lead to drastically different operating and invest-
81. Id.
82. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 2-3 (opening remarks of Senator
Williams). Therefore, contrary to the Supreme Court's uncertainty, the Williams Act
was designed to protect those shareholders who either sold their stock at predisclosure
prices or would not have invested had they known that a takeover bid was imminent.
See note 79 supra.
83. According to the Senate report, "The reduction from 10 to 5% would provide
public disclosure of impending corporate takeovers at a more meaningful level." S. REP.
No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3. (1970). First, acquisitions of 5% can lead to impor-
tant changes in the management or business of a company, and 5% ownership in large
companies involves a large amount of money which can have a significant impact on
corporate control. Id.; Hearings on S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (opening re-
marks of Senator Williams); Hearings on S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 60 (1970) (testimony by Hamer Budge, SEC chairman). Second, the SEC in-
formed the Senate Subcommittee on Securities that in some instances persons were limit-
ing their purchases to 8 or 9% to avoid disclosure and thereby depriving investors of
material information. S. REP. No. 1125, supra at 3; House Hearings on S. 3431, supra
at 61 (testimony by Hamer Budge).
84. The word "investor" is used to include both shareholders of the target corpora-
tion and members of the general investing public. While the Williams Act is primarily
concerned with protecting the shareholder of the target corporation, the Senate and
House hearings and reports and the Congressional Record comments also reveal a spe-
cial concern for protecting the investing public. The investing public needs disclosure
since some of its members may be considering the purchase of stock in either the acquir-
ing or the target company. 1967 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 1. 1967 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 178 (testimony by Manuel Cohen, SEC chairman); id. at 2-3
(opening remarks of Senator Williams); id. at 18 (testimony by Manuel Cohen); 113
CONG. REc. 24665 (1967) (remarks of Senator Kuchel); 116 CONG. REC. 29252 (1970)
(letter from James Walker, executive vice president of American Stock Exchange to
Senator Williams).
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ment results and possibly even to liquidation. 5  Investors are keenly
interested in the competence and integrity of a corporation's manage-
ment and of any persons seeking management. "Secrecy in this area,"
Congress concluded, "is inconsistent with the expectations of the people
who invest in the securities of publicly held corporations and impairs
public confidence in securities as a medium of investment. ' 86 Second,
the target corporation (which in effect means incumbent management)
will be able to respond to a potential change in control before being
confronted with a proxy contest or consummated tender offer-at which
time it may be too late to adequately present its position to the share-
holders. 87 Also, full disclosure to incumbent management provides the
primary means by which shareholders will be informed of the potential
change in control. When incumbent management receives a Schedule
13D it will almost always immediately convey that information to the
shareholders, thereby giving them the information that the act intends
them to have. If shareholders do not receive this information from
management, most of them will probably remain uninformed.
While Congress realized that takeover bids can "serve a useful
purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient manage-
ment," it also realized "that these bids are made for many other reasons
[which] do not always reflect a desire to improve the management of
[a] company." 88 Some are made by raiders whose activities are inimi-
cal to the welfare of the shareholders ;89 many others are made by
companies aiming to become larger or more diversified;90 and a few are
made simply because their financial statements go well together for tax
purposes.9 ' Often an acquiring company succeeds not because it is
better managed, but simply because it has more cash or creditf 2  By
recognizing the various reasons for takeover attempts (some beneficial
to the shareholders, some harmful), it becomes understandable why
incumbent management should be in the position to inform its share-
holders of the potential for a change in corporate control and to present
its case before the shareholders should a contest for control develop.
85. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 18 (testimony by Manuel Cohen).
86. 1967 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2; cf. 113 CoNG. REc. 24664 (1967)
(remarks of Senator Williams).
87. See 1967 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 2-3; 113 CoNG. REc. 855 (1967)
(remarks of Senator Williams); cf. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 201-02 (SEC
memorandum).
88. 1967 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 3.
89. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 43 (remarks of Senator Kuchel);
id. at 179 (testimony by Manuel Cohen).
90. Id.
91. See Hearings on H.R. 14475 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
32 (1968) (testimony by Manuel Cohen).
92. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 179 (testimony by Manuel Cohen).
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The commentators 3 and courts94 have disagreed, however, over
the role that incumbent management is intended to play under the
Williams Act, and the act's ambiguous legislative history fuels the
debate."5 In 1965, prior to the passage of the Williams Act, Senator
Harrison Williams introduced S. 2731, which was designed to protect
incumbent management from corporate raiders. 6 The bill faltered,
and two years later Senator Williams introduced S. 510, a revised
proposal which then received strong SEC and stock exchange support.97
Arguing for S. 510, Senator Williams modified his approach to empha-
size the need for protecting investors rather than incumbent manage-
ment. 98  The new bill still did not satisfy several critics who, testifying
93. See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RurrGEns L. Rv.
609 (1967); Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1973); Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity
Ownership, 119 U. PA. L REv. 853 (1971).
94. Compare Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974);
Bath Indus. Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), with Electronic Specialty
Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp.,
386 F. Supp 44 (D.N.J. 1974); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113
(E.D. Mo. 1971).
95. See S. REP. No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on
S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
96. See 111 CoNG. REc. 28257-58 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams). Corpo-
rate raiders, according to Senator Williams, were white-collar pirates who seized control
of proud old companies with funds, in many cases, from unknown sources for the pur-
pose of selling or trading away the best assets so that the loot could be split up among
themselves. Id. at 28257. Similar language was used by Senator Kuchel, coauthor of
S. 510, upon that bill's introduction to the Senate and during its hearings. 113 CoNG.
Rne. 857 (1967); 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 43. The term "corporate
raider" is less emotionally used to refer to anyone who acquires control of a corporation
with the intent to liquidate it. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 53-56 (testi-
mony by Professor Samuel Hayes). The assumption that most tender offers are made
by corporate raiders was shattered by a study by Professors Hayes and Taussig which
surveyed the chief financial officers of a number of companies which had successfully
taken over other companies. The professors concluded that "corporate raiders in the
classical sense of the word had not been primarily responsible for the greater number
of cash takeover bids. Instead, we found that the cash takeover bid phenomenon seems
to fit into the larger merger movement." Id. at 56. Professor Brudney concludes:
"Such sparse evidence as has been collected suggests that the largest number of takeover
attempts result in continuation of the business of the acquired enterprise." Brudney, A
Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RuTGERs L. Rav. 609, 610 (1967).
97. SEC chairman Manuel Cohen was a major witness during the S. 510 hearings.
Speaking on behalf of S. 510 for the stock exchanges were Donald Calvin, vice president
of the New York Stock Exchange, and Ralph Saul, president of the American Stock Ex-
change.
98. Compare 113 CoNG. REc. 854-56 (1967) [and] 113 CoNG. REc. 24664
(1967), with 111 CoNG. Rnc. 28257-59 (1965). Senator Williams carefully avoided us-
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before the Senate and House subcommittees, expressed alarm that S.
510 would further entrench inefficient incumbent management by dis-
couraging economically desirable takeover attempts.9" Despite those
warnings, the Williams Act gave incumbent management a statutory
right to full and timely disclosure, and the effect of this statutory right is
to allow incumbent management to play a dominant role in the Williams
Act scheme. 100
The Problem with the Rondeau Interpretation
The Supreme Court's mistaken notion of the purposes of the
Williams Act led to an irreparable harm requirement for Williams Act
relief which results in a wide disparity between section 13(d) violations
and situations in which relief will be granted for such violations. A
violation occurs whenever a person acquires 5 percent or more of a
corporation's securities without making full disclosure according to
section 13(d)(1), but relief will be granted only when that person also
makes a tender offer or starts a proxy fight and the shareholders or
management are disadvantaged by the section 13(d) violation. Persons
will make full disclosure, however, only if nondisclosure is sanc-
tioned.1 1 By requiring nondisclosure or inadequate disclosure and a
ing the words "corporate raider" during the 1967 hearings, and he sharply disagreed with
Professor William Painter's testimony that the purpose of S. 510 was to regulate "cor-
porate raiders." 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 122-23.
99. "I have been watching the American newspaper reports in which management
after management, which finds that an outsider is buying a substantial block of stock,
begins litigation, on, what seems to me, very tenuous grounds, largely for dilatory pur-
poses.
"There have been an increasing number, and I think an undesirable number, of
these kinds of blocking actions." 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 125 (testimony
by law professor Stanley Kaplan). In general, those testifying against S. 510 argued
that the Williams Act would be another potent weapon in management's arsenal that
would further unbalance the scales in favor of management. See id. at 114-28 (testi-
mony by attorney Arthur Fleischer, Jr., and law professors Stanley Kaplan and Robert
Mundheim); id. at 165-67 (testimony by Stanley Reed); Hearings on H.R. 14475 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-64 (1968) (testimony by attorney Jordan
Eskin).
100. It seems that Congress, in passing the Williams Act, was trying to strike a
balance between the interest in unbridled economic freedom and corporate democracy
on one hand and the interest in an orderly and honest securities market and an efficient
and sound economy on the other. Whether Congress successfully struck the balance be-
tween these competing interests is both debatable and an issue beyond the scope of this
note. The critics would argue that economic freedom and corporate democracy were
sacrificed to protect politically powerful incumbent managements, resulting in an ineffi-
cient and sluggish economy. Yet whether the Williams Act is economically and socially
desirable is a matter for Congress to decide, and it is the duty of the courts to enforce
the act in light of its purposes.
101. See note 18 supra.
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tender offer or proxy fight before granting injunctive relief, the Supreme
Court is indirectly changing the standard of liability, thereby thwarting
the purposes of the Williams Act.10 2
The Problem with an Irreparable Harm Requirement
Even if the Supreme Court acknowledged the evils section 13(d)
was designed to eradicate--secrecy concerning the potential to challenge
corporate control and the inability of incumbent management to re-
spond immediately to that potential-it is unclear after Rondeau wheth-
er the presence of these evils in a particular case would, without more,
constitute irreparable harm sufficient to justify an injunction. As the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Studebaker Corp. v.
Gittlin'0 3 aptly pointed out, the recitation of the words irreparable harm
"generally produces more dust than light."'1 4
At first glance, the two commonly stated requirements for injunc-
tive relief-irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies-seem
to be separate and distinct. Actually the requirements are closely
connected. Courts label the harm irreparable because the remedy at
law is inadequate (that is, money damages cannot remedy the injury
suffered). 0 5 "Irreparable harm" and "an inadequate remedy at law"
are not, however, completely synonomous terms. Not only must the
remedy at law be inadequate, but the injury must be "certain and
great."'1 6 Injunctive relief will not be granted when the right violated is
102. It is interesting to note that Professor Milton Cohen recommended in a letter
to the Senate Subcommittee on Securities that the section 13(d) disclosure requirements
should not be imposed until the holder of 10% or more of a corporation's securities "ac-
tually assumes management of the issuer or takes affirmative steps (such as a proxy con-
test or a tender offer) to that end . . . ." Letter from Milton H. Cohen to Senator
Williams, Mar. 24, 1967 (included in 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 247). The
language of section 13(d) establishes that Congress rejected Cohen's recommendation,
but the Supreme Court follows this recommendation in determining when to grant in-
"unctive relief.
103. 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). This case involved a proxy rule violation.
104. Id. at 698.
105. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,
561, 567 (1852); Norris, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1949); cf. Donovan
v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 305 (1905); Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton
and Woollen Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 545, 551 (1862); Ainslie Corp. v. Middendorf, 381
F. Supp. 305, 306-07 (D. Mass. 1974); 42 AM. JuR. 2D Injunctions §§ 39, 49 (1969).
In his classic treatise on equity, Pomeroy writes, '"he incompleteness and inadequacy
of the legal remedy is the criterion which, under the settled doctrine, determines the
right to the equitable remedy of injunction." 4 J. POMEROY, EQurrY JURispRUDENcE
§ 1338, at 936 (5th ed. 1941).
106. Love v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 185 F. 321, 331-32 (8th Cir. 1911). See also
Quon v. Stans, 309 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Washington Capitols Basketball
Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 1969). A federal district court
m New Jersey "considers irreparable harm in its generic sense [as] being comprised of
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unimportant or the injury suffered is speculative or trivial.10 7
These general principles suggest that irreparable harm would result
from a section 13(d) violation, even though the violation is not accom-
panied by a tender offer or proxy contest. The remedy at law is
inadequate, as it is virtually impossible to place a price tag on the denial
of full and timely disclosure of the potential to affect or influence
corporate control. At the same time, a section 13(d) violation seems to
result in an injury that is certain and great since nondisclosure of the
potential to affect corporate control was an evil declared by Congress to
require stringent remedial legislation. The courts, however, have not
been able to develop a standard for determining when an injury is
certain and great, which makes it difficult to predict when a court will
find an injury irreparable. Thus, even if the Supreme Court recognized
the broad purposes of the Williams Act, it still could cling to the
Rondeau irreparable harm definition which allows relief for only a
limited number of plaintiffs aggrieved by section 13(d) violations.
Therefore, the fundamental problem with Rondeau is not that it minin-
terprets the Williams Act, but that it requires private litigants to show
irreparable harm.
Discarding the Irreparable Harm Requirement
In requiring a showing of irreparable harm as a prerequisite to
granting injunctive relief, the Supreme Court in Rondeau relied upon
Justice Black's statement in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover that
"[tjhe basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been
irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies."' 1 8  While this
general rule is applied consistently to private controversies between
private parties, numerous cases involving the public interest have dis-
carded the irreparable harm requirement.
When a federal statute authorizes a federal agency or officer to
enforce compliance with the statute by seeking an injunction, a showing
of irreparable harm is not required if the statutory conditions are met. 10 9
two component parts, viz: substantial injury to a material degree coupled with the inade-
quacy of money damages." Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 850
(D.N.J. 1972).
107. See Quon v. Stans, 309 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1970); 42 AM. JUR. 2D
Injunctions § 30 (1969).
108. 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959), quoted in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 57 (1975).
109. The leading case involving the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937). Fair Labor Standards
Act cases: Wirtz v. Young Elec. Sign Co., 315 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1963); Mitchell
v. Jax Beer Distrib. Inc., 290 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1961); Goldberg v. Kickapoo Prairie
Broadcasting Co., 288 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808 (5th
Cir. 1957); Walling v. Brooklyn Braid Co., 152 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1945); Walling v.
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In these cases, the courts are "not bound by the strict requirements of
traditional equity as developed in private litigation," but they "also
consider whether the injunction is reasonably required as an aid in the
administration of the statute, to the end that the congressional purposes
underlying its enactment shall not be thwarted."' 10  "Mhe standards
of the public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure
the need for injunctive relief.""'
Irreparable harm is not required for two main reasons. First,
requiring irreparable harm may hinder the enforcement of a statute
passed by Congress to protect the public interest. Second, "[t]he
passage of the statute is, in a sense, an implied finding that violations
will harm the public and ought, if necessary, [to] be restrained.""' 2 To
obtain injunctive relief, the federal agency or officer only has to show
that the statute has been violated and either that future violations are
likely or that the violator will profit from his wrongdoing if the request
for relief is denied. There is no need to show that the particular
violation actually caused the harm the statute was designed to pre-
vent.
113
Private parties have received injunctive relief without showing
irreparable harm under the Railway Labor Act of 1926.1" This act" 5
was designed to prevent interruptions of interstate commerce by labor
disputes, 1 6 but its provisions giving the plaintiffs various legal rights did
not contain any statutory penalties."" The absence of penalties, how-
Panther Creek Mines, Inc., 148 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1945). Agricultural Adjustment Act
cases: Shafer v. United States, 229 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1956); American Fruit Growers,
Inc. v. United States, 105 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1939). Other cases include United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (Internal Revenue Code); United States
v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (Raker Act); United States v. Diapulse
Corp., 457 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1972) (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); Douds
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 242 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1957) (National Labor Relations
Act); ICC v. All Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (Motor Carrier
Act).
110. Walling v. Brooklyn Braid Co., 152 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1945).
Ill. Walling v. Panther Creek Mines, Inc., 148 F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir. 1945),
quoted in Goldberg v. Kickapoo Prairie Broadcasting Co., 288 F.2d 778, 782 (8th Cir.
1961).
112. United States v. Diapulse Corp., 457 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1972). See also
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. United States, 105 F.2d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1939).
113. See United States v. Diapulse Corp., 457 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1972); Douds
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 242 F.2d 808, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1957); American Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. United States, 105 F.2d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1939).
114. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.
0. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
115. 45 U.S.C §§ 151-63 (1970).
116. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553 (1937); Texas
& N. 0. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565 (1930).
117. See Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
569 (1930).
September 19761 RONDEAU v. MOSINEE PAPER CORP.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ever, did not deter the Supreme Court from holding that the act created
a private right of action, which necessarily implied a remedy to make
that right effective.118  While implying the remedy of injunction, 119 the
Court used the following rationale in not requiring a showing of irrepar-
able harm:
More is involved than the settlement of a private controversy with-
out appreciable consequences to the public. The peaceable settle-
ment of labor controversies, especially where they may seriously
impair the ability of an interstate rail carrier to perform its service
to the public, is a matter of public concern. . . . Courts of equity
may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold
relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed
to go when only private interests are involved.' 20
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. falls into a different class of
cases. These cases arise under federal statutes which expressly provide
for enforcement by a federal agency or official but are silent as to the
right of private parties to bring suit. Cort v. Ash12 ' laid out the relevant
factors in determining whether a private right of action is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one. First, is the plaintiff a member of
the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted? Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent to create or deny a private right
of action? Third, is a private right of action consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme? And fourth,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in
an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?' 22
118. See id.
119. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553 (1937);
Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569 (1930).
120. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). Em-
phasizing the flexibility courts should exercise in granting relief to enforce a statute, the
court said, "But the extent to which equity will go to give relief where there is no ade-
quate remedy at law is not a matter of fixed rule. It rests rather in the sound discretion
of the court." Id. at 551.
121. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
122. Id. at 78. In Cort, the plaintiff argued that a cause of action in favor of cor-
porate shareholders against corporate directors should be implied under 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970), which is "a criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making 'a contribu-
tion or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presi-
dential electors . . . are to be voted for.'" Id. at 68. The implied private right of ac-
tion was denied on the grounds that the protection of shareholders was only a secondary
concern of the statute, whose primary concern was to destroy the influence corporations
exercised during elections through financial contributions. Two other recent cases re-
ject an implied private right of action. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v Bar-
bour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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The Supreme Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections'23 emphasized
an additional factor-does the enforcing federal agency or official need
the assistance of private suits to make the statute effective?- 24
Private litigants were given standing to sue under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by J.L Case Co. v. Borak,23 a case involving a
proxy rule violation. The 1934 act expressly authorizes the SEC to
bring an action in federal court to enjoin violations and states that "upon
a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining
order shall be granted without bond."' 2 6 Private suits are not expressly
provided for, but section 27 of the 1934 act grants general jurisdiction
to the federal courts in "all suits in equity and actions at law, brought to
enforce any liability or duty" created by the act or rules thereunder. 127
The Court in Borak saw in section 27 an implied private right of action
for proxy rule violations since one of the chief purposes of the proxy
rules was the protection of investors. 2 s According to the Court, the
private enforcement of the proxy rules would provide a necessary sup-
plement to SEC action as the commission does not have the resources to
independently examine the facts set out in the proxy materials it re-
ceives . 23  The possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief brought
about by private litigation, it was said, would serve as a potent weapon
in the enforcement of the proxy requirements. 3 ' Therefore, the Court
concluded that an implied right of action was necessary to accomplish
the congressional purpose.31
The same reasoning, of course, applied to implied rights of action
in enforcing section 13(d)-perhaps even more forcefully. Section
13(d) is designed to protect investors and incumbent management from
covert attempts to gain corporate control. The SEC independently can
123. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
124. Id. at 556-57. This case found an implied private right of action under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Since the act, the goal of which was to make the guarantees
of the fifteenth amendment a reality for all citizens, extended not only to the states but
also to their subdivisions, the Court recognized that the attorney general's limited staff
might be unable to prosecute all violations. Therefore, the goal of the act "might well
prove an empty promise unless the private citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforce-
ment of the prohibition." Id. at 557.
125. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). This section is more commonly known as sec-
tion 21 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
128. 377 U.S. at 432. The court found it significant that language almost identical
to section 27 was relied upon to allow purchasers of securities to bring an action under
the Securities Act of 1933 to rescind an allegedly fraudulent sale in Deckert v. Inde-
pendent Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
129. 377 U.S. 426, 432.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 433.
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neither examine for accuracy the facts set out in a Schedule 13D nor
discover when a person has failed to file. Thus, private litigation is the
only effective means of enforcement.
Since the private litigant steps into the shoes of the SEC in bringing
suit for section 13(d) violations, the Supreme Court should not require
a showing of irreparable harm. The standards designed to protect the
public interest, not the requirements designed for private litigation,
should define the need for injunctive relief.'32 The fact that an implied
right of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is based on
section 27, while the SEC's authority to seek relief is based on section
21, is immaterial since both the private and public causes of action are
aimed at the same goal-securing compliance with the statute. Making
the private litigant show irreparable harm frustrates the purpose of the
statute and hinders its enforcement.
Discarding the irreparable harm requirement for implied private
rights of action is consistent with the generally accepted judicial philoso-
phy of granting a wide range of relief in order to effectuate the various
purposes of the securities laws. 3 3  As the Supreme Court in Borak
points out, "[i]t is for the federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as
to grant the necessary relief' where federally secured rights are invad-
ed."' 3 4  For example, section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193411 authorizes the SEC to bring suit in the federal courts to enjoin
violations of the act. The Second Circuit has granted the SEC's re-
quests for broad equitable relief, including the appointment of receivers
and restitution, even though section 21(e) expressly authorizes only
injunctions. 36 This ancillary relief was supported by section 27 of the
act, which confers general equity power upon the district courts.'
3 T
Rejecting the argument that section 27 applies only to private litigants
and that the SEC can seek only injunctions, the Second Circuit read
sections 21(e) and 27 together, allowing other equitable relief in order
to further the purposes of the act.'3 8
132. See note 99 & text accompanying notes 103-20 supra, 139-44 infra.
133. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972): SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
134. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433 (1964), quoting Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
136. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
138. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir.
1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971). "Congress
has enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme in the securities field to 'insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets' and to provide 'full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold . . . and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . . .' The
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Rondeau's Misplaced Reliance on Hecht and Deckert
The Supreme Court in Rondeau properly noted that Hecht Co. v.
Bowles8 9 forecloses the argument that the bare fact of a violation of
section 13(d) compels an injunction. 140 The law is clear that Congress
must make its intent plain and certain when it wants to require a
mandatory injunction upon the violation of a statute; otherwise, the
courts have discretion in granting or withholding equitable relief.141 The
Court in Rondeau is mistaken, however, when it states that the reason-
ing of Hecht "suggests that the District Court here was entirely correct
in insisting that [Mosinee Paper] satisfy the traditional prerequisites of
extraordinary relief by establishing irreparable harm."'142 To the con-
trary, Hecht supports the proposition that a federal officer need not
show irreparable harm when seeking an injunction to enforce a federal
statute, which suggests that a private litigant seeking injunctive relief
based on an implied right of action under that statute should not have to
show irreparable harm either. In Hecht, the Supreme Court held that
the Emergency Price Control Act administrator's request for an injunc-
tion could be properly denied by the district court not because the
administrator failed to show irreparable harm, but because under the
particular circumstances of the case before it, an injunction would not
serve the purposes of the act. 148  Writing for the majority, Justice
Douglas instructed the lower court that its discretion
must be exercised in light of the large objectives of the [Price Con-
trol] Act. For the standards of the public interest, not -the require-
ments of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for in-
junctive relief in these cases.' 44
The Rondeau Court also relied on Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp. 45 to support its irreparable harm requirement for implied rights
of action. In Deckert, an early Securities Act case, the Court required
the private party as plaintiff to state a cause of action that met the
power to implement these policies has been given to the SEC and to the courts and it
is necessary that these institutions have the flexibility to enforce the securities acts in
ways that are particularly suited to the case at hand." Comment, Equitable Remedies
in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 1190 (1975), quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78b (1970), and Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Preamble. 48 Stat. 74.
139. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
140. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60 (1975).
141. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944); SEC v. United States
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455-57 (1940). Cf. Porter v. Warner Hold-
ing Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4,
15, 17 (1942).
142. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975).
143. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
144. Id. at 331.
145. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
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customary rules governing suits of similar character. 146 More recently,
however, the Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.1 7 concluded that
a private party does not have to meet a common law fraud test to state a
cause of action under the proxy rules, but need only show that mislead-
ing statements in a proxy solicitation were material and that the solicita-
tion itself "was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transac-
tion" voted upon. 148 Private parties were given a streamlined cause of
action to facilitate the enforcement of the proxy rules.' 4 9 The Court in
Rondeau acknowledges the value of streamlined causes of action, 150 but
fails to recognize that measuring relief by traditonal requirements, appli-
cable to private controversies between private parties, frustrates private
enforcement of securities laws just as much as requiring causes of action
to conform to common law principles.
Conclusion: The Right Result for the Wrong Reason
In Rondeau, the Supreme Court was provided with an ideal factual
situation to lay down its irreparable harm requirement for private liti-
gants seeking injunctive relief under an implied right of action. Ron-
deau's violation apparently arose from ignorance rather than from an
intent to act covertly, and there was no evidence suggesting that he
would not comply with the securities laws in the future.' 5 ' Also, the
relief granted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit bore little
relationship to the seriousness of Rondeau's wrongdoing. 5 2 Thus, even
if the Court did not require a showing of irreparable harm, it could have
concluded as a matter of equity that the purposes of the Williams Act
would not be furthered by granting injunctive relief.
While the Court may have reached a just result in Rondeau, the
perniciousness of its reasoning becomes apparent when applied to differ-
ent factual situations. For example, in Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot' 53
and in GAF Corp. v. Milstein, T4 the defendants formulated plans to
seek corporate control. Allegedly constituting groups under section
13(d)(3), they failed to make timely disclosures. Assuming that the
defendants in Bath and GAF made adequate disclosures before trial, that
the plaintiffs sought permanent injunctive relief, and that the courts
applied the Rondeau irreparable harm requirement, relief would not be
146. Id. at 288.
147. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
148. Id. at 384-85.
149. Id. at 385.
150. 422 U.S. at 64.
151. See note 59 & accompanying text supra.
152. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
153. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
154. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971).
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granted. Even though the defendants intentionally attempted to avoid
disclosing their takeover plans, relief would be denied because full
disclosure was made before a tender offer or proxy contest. Such a
result is clearly contrary to the purpose of the Williams Act which is to
alert the marketplace at the earliest moment of the potential for a
change in corporate control."' On the other hand, if the courts fol-
lowed the standards used in deciding whether to grant relief to a federal
agency seeking to enforce a federal statute, relief would be granted. 56
The purpose of the Williams Act would be effectuated by fashioning
equitable relief which would deter the defendants from making further
violations and would prevent the defendants from profiting from their
wrongdoing.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's fears, discarding the irreparable
harm requirement for private litigants seeking injunctive relief under
section 13(d) would not hinder the wide discretion that courts need in
exercising their equitable powers. The courts could continue to recon-
cile the competing interests before them, denying relief to parties who
bring frivolous suits for the sole purpose of delaying or defeating a
takeover attempt. Thus, while the Rondeau irreparable harm require-
ment was not necessary to preserve equitable discretion, it does dilute
the potency of implied rights of action, which serve to protect the public
interest by ensuring that the prohibitions of a federal statute are made
effective.
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